Making the Safety Case Work – Post Macondo and Montara
SPE-134059-PP
Below is an article written for the SPE/APPEA conference in 2012. Contact us if you would like a copy of the full article, or see below:
https://onepetro.org/SPEHSE/proceedings-abstract/12HSE/12HSE/SPE-158199-MS/158929
Brendan Fitzgerald and Paul Breen, Vanguard Solutions Pty Ltd, and Joe Patrick, SPE, Hunter Oil Pty Ltd
Copyright 2012, SPE/APPEA International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE/APPEA International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production held in Perth, Australia, 11–13 September 2012.
This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE/APPEA program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers or the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association Limited and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers or the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association Limited, its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers or the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association Limited is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of SPE copyright.
Abstract
The paper will consider the implementation of the Safety Case in the oil and gas industry in Australia, and internationally, post the Macondo and Montara incidents.
The National Commission Report into the Deepwater Horizon / Macondo blowout stated:
“The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout … …. that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry. “
In their letter to Minister Ferguson on 22 March 2011, the NOPSA Board stated:
“The Montara and Macondo incidents each demonstrate technical ignorance and a poor safety culture including complacency regarding low probability, high consequence risks. There is a clear need to improve industry safety culture, accountability and leadership.”
The paper will examine these criticisms and consider how the industry could improve its process safety and risk management.
The implementation of a Safety Case in the USA may only occur “in the typical rule-making process that takes up to two years” (Michael Bromwich, Director of BOEMRE). Knowledge, understanding and application of key aspects of process safety management and the preparation and implementation of the Safety Case process are not uniform. The paper will suggest how, in this context, the Safety Case can be applied to achieve the improved outcomes.
The paper will draw from specific findings from the Macondo and Montara incidents. In particular, and of some concern, there are echoes and parallels of the Piper Alpha disaster in the performance of emergency systems on Deepwater Horizon. Inadequate application of hazardous area classification is a key issue which the paper will discuss in order to provide greater understanding. Whilst in Australia, issues of competency, consistency and quality arise with matters such as performance standards. The paper will discuss the need for an industry accepted standard for “performance standards” that goes beyond current regulatory guidelines.
Overall, the paper will seek to propose a way forward for the industry in several practical areas.
An Industry Doubted
In the space of eight months in 2009 and 2010, two well blow-outs occurred on the opposite sides of the world that would have a significant effect on the regulation and management of safety in the offshore industry beyond the shores of the individual countries affected.
On 21 August 2009, the West Atlas jackup rig was undertaking completion of a well on the recently installed Montara wellhead platform (operated by PTTEP Australasia) when a blowout occurred. Fortunately the hydrocarbon release remained unignited and all personnel were evacuated safely. However, for a period of over ten weeks, oil and gas was discharged freely to the environment – estimated to be greater than 30,000 barrels of liquids and unknown quantities of gas. Towards the end of well kill operation the hydrocarbon discharge was ignited, causing massive damage to both the wellhead platform and the jackup.
On 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling the Macondo exploration well on behalf of BP and its joint venture partners. A temporary abandonment activity failed and a blowout occurred. The blowout resulted in an explosion that caused the deaths of eleven men. The rig sank on 22 April 2010. For 87 days oil continued to be discharged to the environment – estimated to be of the order of 5 million barrels.
All this took place under the gaze of the world’s press.
In the aftermath, a number of commissions and investigations made their findings. A common finding was a damning indictment of the safety culture and risk management in the industry. In the United States, the National Commission (2011) on the Deepwater Horizon disaster found:
The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.
In Australia, the advisory Board to the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA Board, 2011) wrote to the Australian Government Minister responsible regarding their conclusions regarding the incidents:
The Montara and Macondo incidents each demonstrate technical ignorance and a poor safety culture including complacency regarding low probability, high consequence risks. There is a clear need to improve industry safety culture, accountability and leadership.
Since these comments, there have been a number of developments in the industry in an effort to respond to the concerns expressed. This paper considers the process safety and risk management in the industry in light of these criticisms.
Read the full article below:
https://onepetro.org/SPEHSE/proceedings-abstract/12HSE/12HSE/SPE-158199-MS/158929
